DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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FROM : BRUSSELS, 289 Mar.4,1950

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EUR INDEX

SUBJECT : The Belgian Royal Question: Popular Consultation March ? on the Return of Leopold III

755.00 XR 11

This is an excellent, timely summary of the situation.

I. THE QUESTION

On March 12 all Belgians eligible to vote (men and women over 21 years of age) will be compulsorily required to cast ballots on the proposition: "Are you of the opinion that King Leopold III should again take up the exercise of his Constitutional powers?"1/ A corollary to this proposition, although it will not be printed on the ballot, is an amendment approved by the Belgian Chamber on February 8, making it clear that "the question posed does not affect the principle of the constitutional monarchy, nor the continuity of the Dynasty, nor the manner in which the Belgian Army acted in 1940".2/

II. PARADOX

The Belgian Royal Question which has plagued the country since the capitulation of the King on May 28,1940, is one of almost unending paradox.

The Monarchy, which has as its principal reason for existence the fact that it is the asserted symbol of union between the disparate elements of the populace--the Dutch-speaking Flemish, the French-speaking Walloons, the unreligious freethinkers and the deeply religious Catholics, the rich and the poor--has become in the person of its disputed Monarch a symbol of disunion.

An additional paradox, and a corollary to the foregoing proposition, is the fact that the principal opponent of the King, Paul Henri-Spaak, has long insisted that Popular Consultation places not only the Monarch but the Monarchy itself in question. We now find that the Belgian newspaper which is the first protagonist in the fight for Leopold's return, La Libre Belgique, is using Spaak's argument as one in favor of the King, insisting that the Popular Consultation does not place the Monarchy at stake, with the alternative to a negative vote on Leopold III, a Belgian Republic.

To continue the list of paradoxes, that of the greatest historical interest is the fact that the Belgian War-time Government, headed by

PIERLOT

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PIERLOT, many of whose Ministers have since come out against the King, secretly requested the Department of State, on July 7,1944, to insure the prompt liberation of Leopold as soon as the fighting in Europe had ceased3/; and repeated this request in August.4/ [redacted] B-1

It is likewise ironical to note that the present legal basis for the King's exile, the Law of July 19,1945, in which Parliament solemnly declared that the King should not resume the exercise of his constitutional powers "until after the deliberation of the two Chambers, united as one, made evident that the impossibility of reigning had ended", was the ex-post-facto legislative sanction of the act of the Belgian Government in exile which, on May 30,1940, at Paris, had approved a decree stating that the King was no longer able to reign as he was in the hands of the enemy. Thus the Parliamentary law of 1945 was adopted at a time when the "enemy" had ceased to exist, though the King, and what to do about him, remained an increasingly urgent problem.

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To cap this confusing situation, the King's mother, Queen Elizabeth, who has given her name and prestige to various Communist-front organizations, and who has in her entourage one, if not more, ardent Communists, is a champion of Leopold's cause although the Communist Party in Belgium is energetically in opposition to the King.

III. AN EMOTIONAL QUESTION

The purpose of this long recitation is to underscore the fact that the Belgian Royal Question is as disturbing and as murky as the pot stirred by Macbeth's witches. Out of such a bubble of emotion and steam of recrimination and counter-recrimination, it is difficult to take the auspices. The basic fact is that this is an emotional issue and the Belgians by race and temperament are a dour, hardfisted calculating people, who are unaccustomed to dealing with matters of sentiment. Therefore, the problem of Leopold III leaves them in doubt, and as the hour of balloting draws close, the Belgians themselves can make no sure prediction as to the outcome.*

The first/

*An informal poll of the Embassy Staff revealed that 35 thought Leopold would receive (averaging their guesses) 60.3% of the national vote; 10 thought he would poll an average of 43.8%.

The first thing which strikes the general observer who has made a study of the documents is that during the past five years opinions have changed very little on the question of the King. Literally thousands of pages have been published on the issue of whether Leopold III comported himself well during the war and thus has earned the right to resume the throne. The Parliamentary debates in the summer of 1945 were rehashed almost word for word, so far as the essential facts were concerned, in the discussions preceding and after the General Elections of 1949, and in the arguments before both Houses on the Popular Consultation, which was finally adopted February 8 1950.7/

IV. THE PARTISANS

A brief examination of the facts will be set forth below. It is desired at this juncture, however, to stress that the recitation of the facts had done little to change public opinion. The supporters of the King remained as entrenched and ardent as ever while his opponents and detractors repeat their arguments with the same enthusiasm.

[redacted] B-1

Those who desire the return of Leopold find their strength in the Catholic Party (PSC) which, in turn, finds its strength among the faithful in the Catholic congregations and, on a linguistic and racial basis, in the Flemish population of Belgium. The opponents of Leopold are the Socialist Party, made up of workers, intellectuals and some middle class, and the Communists who are vocal but weak in numbers. In the middle, and evenly divided among themselves, are the adherents of the Belgian Liberal Party, many of whom intellectually are opposed to the King's return while others, particularly such great magnates as the SOLVAY family, wealthy and conservative, are not only staunch supporters of the King but lavish contributors to his campaign funds.

V. THE POLL

Many observers, including M. Spaak himself, have sought to draw conclusions from the election returns of June 26, 1949. In these elections, the PSC, supporting the King, had 43.5% of the votes cast but, because of the proportional system of voting prevalent in Belgium, won a majority in the Senate and came within a few seats of the majority in the Chamber.8/

[redacted] B-1

It is

It is perhaps misleading to draw conclusions from the last election although surely the principal issue of that election was the Royal Question. This is so because the Belgian system of proportional voting in national elections, which gives full weight to minority opinions and seems destined always to return coalition governments, is by no means the same as the poll which will be taken on March 12. Here, for once, the Belgian electorate has the opportunity of voting Yes or No on a black and white issue, and there will be none of the intricate mathematics of proportional voting to show variations of opinion.



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It must be kept in mind that the Popular Consultation has no constitutionally binding effect. It is not a referendum, not a plebiscite. It is an official sounding of national opinion, ostensibly to guide Parliament which alone has power to rescind the law which keeps the King in exile.

VI. THE CASE

What is the case for and against Leopold III? The Socialist Party had summed up the case in a full-page statement in Le Peuple of February 22,1950, which has been reproduced in thousands of hand bills which are now being distributed throughout the country. In brief, the case against Leopold is summed up under the headings of his conduct as Chief of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Belgian Army during the eighteen days of war against the German Wehrmacht; his conduct vis-a-vis the Germans while a "prisoner of war"; his marriage to a commoner; and the revelation recently made to the Belgian people that at the time of his marriage he had resumed the hated German family title of Prince of Saxe-Cobourg-Gotha.

Under the first of these headings, Mr. Spaak and his adherents charge that Leopold, against the unanimous advice of his Government, decided to remain in Belgium, and abandoned the Allies whose casue he had previously pledged to support. Leopold, by this act, it is claimed, neglected his royal duty as head of State to carry on the war with the Government in Exile. The indictment continues that, as he became a German captive, retained in luxury in his palace at Laeken, the King sought, despite the fact that the Constitution states that no acó of the Monarch is valid without the counter-signature of the Minister, to follow a political role. Thus, it is claimed that he sent instructions to Belgian diplomats abroad; intervened in order that the gold of the National Bank which had been taken to France should be given to the Germans; was in contact with the collaborationists in Belgium through his own secretary, Count CAPELLE; and went on to Berchtesgaden

in the

in the capacity of Chief of State to see Hitler and to discuss with the German Feuhrer the political future of Belgium and of his own Dynasty.

Furthermore, on the King's marriage on December 6,1941 to a commoner, Mlle Lillian BAELS, was of dubious notoriety in Belgium since her father, when Governor of the West Flanders, fled from his post before the German invasion, and her brother was condemned to three years' imprisonment in absentia for not having fulfilled his military duty. [redacted] B-1

[redacted] Furthermore, so far as Leopold's marriage to Mlle Baels is concerned, the Socialists have been quick to point out that, by contracting the civil marriage three months after the religious ceremony, the King violated his own Constitution's Article 16, which provides, among other things, that "civil marriage shall always precede the religious ceremony"; while Article 267 of the Penal Code provides punishment for Ministers of the Gospel (in this case, the Cardinal-Archbishop of Belgium himself) who conduct religious marriage services before the civil marriage.

In assaying these charges and before the complete indictment had been formulated, Ambassador SAWYER early in 1945 wrote to the Department on the gradual shift in Belgian opinion on the King. When Leopold III surrendered to the Germans on May 28,1940, the Belgians universally approved his action, not only as a gallant gesture in his own person, assuming the role of prisoner of war, but also as a practical step because it seemed that the Germans had won the war. However, as the war continued, and the Germans began to lose, the Resistance Movement became heroic and popular, and the King's absence from leadership in the Resistance casued many to doubt him.10/ Nevertholess, there seems to be no reason to suppose that, had the King returned to Belgium immediately after his liberation by American troops in Austria on May 7,11/ he would not have been welcomed, not only by the populace but by the Government.

In fact, the Belgian Government had continued its efforts to rescue the King and had again requested the assistance of the Supreme Allied Commander to secure the release of Leopold and his family. Thus a directive had been sent by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General EISENHOWER on October 6,1944, pursuant to this request, "in view of the necessity for the King of the Belgians to be liberated and to rejoin his Ministers at the earliest possible moment".12/

The repeated delegations of Belgian statesmen and politicians who consulted with Leopold after his liberation and while he was still in Austria had yet to formulate their final views pro or con. [redacted] B-1

[redacted] His health, however, was in a precarious state, his nerves were shaky, and he asked his brother Charles to continue the Regency "until my recovery".13/ Nevertheless, there was a continued expectation that the King would shortly return14/, [redacted] B-1

At that

At that time, Van Acker, the Prime Minister, said that [redacted] B-1
[redacted] it was the King's own decision to remain outside of the country for the time being, and that he was making no demands on him.16/

[redacted] B-1
Furthermore, the steering committee of the Socialist Party in June, 1945 adopted a resolution calling for the King's abdication on the ground that he had violated Article 64 of the Constitution by refusing to heed his ministers' advice to continue the war in exile.18/ Spaak himself came out publicly for abdication in a newspaper interview at the end of June, 1945.19/ After a tense and troubled summer, marked by the decision of the Van Acker Government on June 16 to resign on hearing news that the King intended to return 20/, and by the King's attempt to form a new government from his vantage point in Switzerland 21/, matters came to a head in mid-July. The King, in a letter dated July 14, declared:

> "The lack of balance which circumstances have established between Parliament and the Nation does not permit me, at this time, to determine which is the will of the Country. I will wait, therefore, to make a definite decision, until regular elections have reestablished the harmony which must exist between the composition of the Houses and the political attitude of the citizens which they represent."

He added, "I renounce the right of reentering the country before a national consultation shall have taken place."22/ Thus, by this document, Leopold III established two conditions precedent to his return, one of which has been realized—national elections—and the other of which—national consultation—is about to take place.

[redacted] Van Acker B-1
at last sought to clear up the legal anomaly of having a Prince Regent as acting head of State while the titular head of State was in exile abroad. As previously indicated, the Regency depended on a wartime decree of the Government in Exile, declaring that Leopold was "in the impossibility of reigning because of enemy action". Now, even though Leopold was no longer in German hands, the Van Acker Government introduced a bill in Parliament, providing that the King should resume his constitutional powers only if and when the two Houses, joined as one, should agree that it was no longer impossible for him to reign.23/ This uneasy and unsatisfactory legal compromise became law on July 19, 1945. 24/

The Royal Question then occupied a less prominent place in Belgian political thinking as the energies of the country were devoted to restoring the national economy, which had atrophied during the war. However, Leopold, [redacted] B-1
was determined to clear his name and return to the throne. Stung by the Socialist charges against his wartime conduct, the King, on his own initiative, formed a commission of ten prominent Belgians, evenly divided between the Right and Left, to scrutinize his official papers and to report to the Belgian people on his activities prior to, during, and after the war.25/ This commission was established in July 1946. Its voluminous report, later known as the "Servais Report", from the name of the Chairman, was published in June 1947. The report by and large repeated the King's own version of his conduct, produced little effect on the public mind, and certainly no change in previously formed opinions. 26/

On the whole, the King's case is this: Contrary to popular belief, it was Leopold III alone who opposed making peace with the Germans in 1940. The King, through the Belgian Military Attaché in Paris, had warned the French Government, and General GAMELIN in particular, on April 29, 1940, of the impending German invasion in the Sedan area. The King, in his quality as Commander in Chief of the Belgian Army, had asked the French General Staff to send officers to prepare joint plans for the defense of the Sedan area and the Belgian line along the River Meuse. After the German breakthrough and in the days preceding the evacuation from Dunkirk, it was the King who withstood the pleas of his Government to sue for peace with the Germans. It was not until late in the summer of 1940 that various prominent Belgians felt it worthwhile to assemble around Pierlot in London in order to form a provisional government. As for the King's alleged visit to Hitler at Berchtesgaden, this the King had refused categorically on June 9, 1940, while the eventual interview which took place with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on November 27, 1940, had been wildly distorted in the notes which Hitler's interpreter transcribed in Berlin some days after the affair.[27] As for the actual memorandum of Leopold's interview with Hitler, of which photostats are in the Department's possession, and the text of which was eventually published in Belgium, it could be taken either way. The partisans of the King might claim he had merely sought to assure Belgium's future independence and provide more food for the country during the Occupation, while his antagonists might claim he was anticipating the role of Belgium in an eventual German New Order.[28] Of the same equivocal character (because it came from the wrong quarter), was the testimony in the King's defense from none other than the German General of Occupation, von FALKENHAUSEN, who told Allied intelligence officers that Leopold's conduct while a prisoner of war had always been correct, and that his first concern was for his country.[29]

VII. ELECTIONS AND POPULAR CONSULTATION

Since the repeated efforts of partisans on both sides to resolve the Royal Question had met with stalemate, and since it seemed probable that national elections would soon have to be held, the King, in a letter to Prime Minister Spaak, dated June 22, 1948, reaffirmed his position of July 14, 1945, and again referred to the matter of Popular Consultation. In the letter of June 22, 1948, he declared himself willing to abide by a majority decision in such a Popular Consultation to determine whether or not the Belgian people had withdrawn their confidence from him. If such a Consultation did not give a "indisputable majority" he would abdicate.[30] However, Prime Minister Spaak and the Socialist Party President, Buset, took the line that the proper way to deal with the Royal Question was by having a General Election, and that a Popular Consultation, if not outright unconstitutional was certainly extra-constitutional.[31]

In October 1948, a bill calling for a popular consultation was defeated by the narrowest of margins in the Senate. The vote was 83 in favor of Popular Consultation and 83 against. However, under Belgian parliamentary practice, a tie vote is a negative vote and the motion was lost. The Catholic Senators voted solidly for a Popular Consultation, the Socialists, Liberals and Communists against.[32]

The Belgians were back where they had started from and the Royal Question seemed as insolvable as ever. The next step was the establishment, by Parliament, of a commission to examine the application of certain Belgian constitutional principles to the Royal Question. In particular, the commission was instructed to examine these articles of the Constitution involving a possible conflict as between the duties of the King as head of State, and as Commander in Chief of the Army. The Moniteur Belge of March 13, 1949, announced that the commission would be made up of seven parliamentarians of the PSC, seven Socialists, two Liberals, two members of the Supreme Court of Appeal, and four professors. However, by mid-summer the press reported that the commission had not been able to reach a unanimous agreement on its conclusions although it was believed, especially in view of the commitments the Belgians had undertaken under the North Atlantic Treaty, that the King should not be both head of State and Commander in Chief.[33]

The Belgian National elections were fixed for July 26, 1949. They were significant as being held in times of peaceful prosperity, and even more significant in that the Flemish population had increased by 400,000 people since the last census of 1938, and that for the first time Belgian women were admitted to universal suffrage.

King Leopold at once began to gather his forces for the coming struggle. As a litmus paper test of popular sentiment, his daughter Princess Josephine Charlotte was sent to Brussels in April, ostensibly to visit her grandmother, Queen Elizabeth,[34] and the manifestations of popular affection for the agreeable young girl were doubtless pleasing to the exiled King at Pregny.

The King's next step was to call his brother Charles to visit him, if possible, before Easter, in anticipation of the new elections. Finally, the Prince Regent and Spaak together saw Leopold on April 25. Spaak's advice to the King, not to interject the Royal Question into the electoral campaign, doubtless fell on deaf ears, although Leopold was not long in issuing another of his characteristically lengthy letters, dated April 30, and addressed to his brother Charles. This communication, which was relayed to the press on May 4, restated the propositions of the letter of June 22, 1948, and expressed the hope that the Royal Question might be settled before the National Elections.[35]

Meanwhile, the Socialist press campaign against Leopold had waxed [redacted] B-1
[redacted] and the King [redacted] published a letter to the Prime Minister, B-1
dated May 17, 1949, protesting the calumnies of the press against himself and his family, thus insuring that these calumnies would receive more assiduous public attention.[36]

As indicated above, the elections of July 26 were not conclusive although the Catholic Party, which has been consistently pro-Leopold, received the largest vote, came close to a majority in the Lower House and obtained a narrow majority in the Senate. For the longest period in Belgian constitutional history, the Kingdom was not only without a King but without a government, as various political leaders sought to [redacted] consolidate B-1
a coalition government. [redacted] the present Foreign Minister, Paul van ZEELAND, sought in vain to establish a government[37]; B-1

he was succeeded in this effort by the leader of the Catholic Party DE SCHRYVER[38]; the president of the Chamber of Deputies, van CAUWELAERT[39]; and finally by the former Minister of Finance in Spaak's Cabinet, Gaston EYSKENS, a relatively unknown younger politician of the PSC, [redacted] B-1

The point at issue in all of these efforts was the inevitable and ineluctable Royal Question. Finally, worn out by haggling and with the matter yet unresolved, Eyskens was able to form a cabinet on August 10, 1949, made up almost equally of Catholic and Liberal Ministers. Meanwhile, there began the first of flights of various politicians, Socialists, PSC members and Liberals, to visit the King in Switzerland in an endeavor to secure a better definition from him as to what was the "indisputable majority" without which he would abdicate.[41] The Socialists, fighting a hard rear-guard action, fell back on the line that if the detested Popular Consultation were voted at least the King should agree to abdicate if he did not get 66% of all votes cast.[42] The Liberals proposed that if the King got 70%, Parliament should at once vote his return. If he got less than 55%, he should abdicate, and if the figure lay between the two, it would be [redacted] B-1 "for Parliament to decide".[43] The King [redacted] B-1 in a public letter to the leaders of the three principal parties, delivered on August 5, by saying that the Popular Consultation was merely a guide to Parliament; that it was not admissible to limit parliamentary freedom of action by agreeing before hand to any fixed percentage; but that if on returning to the throne it should appear that he could not be "of use to his country", he would abdicate in favor of his eldest son.[44]

NB.

The battle of percentages continued and was finally partially resolved when Prime Minister Eyskens saw the King on October 16. A joint communique, issued by the office of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of the King on October 19, said that the Prime Minister had explained to Leopold III the desirability of a Popular Consultation, which he thought should best be by electoral districts, and that the two had agreed that if the King received 55% or less of the popular vote, he would abdicate. If he received more, it would be for Parliament to decide whether or not to rescind the law of July 19, 1945.[45]

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The Belgian Senate passed the bill for Popular Consultation on October 27, 1949 by a vote of 109 in favor and 65 against.[46]

This marked the start of a furious political campaign, the Socialists digging in on their first line of defense to defeat the Popular Consultation Bill, if possible, in the Lower House. However, in a national broadcast on October 25, Spaak, already anticipating that the Popular Consultation would be held, demanded that the King abdicate unless he polled a two-thirds vote. [redacted] B-1 Z

Spaak's next move was to open a series of articles in Le Peuple which

in terms of matchless invective documented the case against the King. A brief of the Socialist argument has been set forth above. [redacted] B-1

Meanwhile, the often-threatened Socialist recourse to nationwide strikes in case the King should come back proved, on analysis, to contain less menace than had been thought. Belgium was suffering from severe unemployment which would certainly not make political strikes attractive to the workers, and furthermore, over half of organized labor was in the Catholic Labor Federation which would surely not join in any strike against Leopold. [redacted] B-1

On the eve of the final decision of the Belgian Chamber to approve the Popular Consultation Bill, and in the various debates which took place in the Lower House, allegations were made that the ambassadors of the United Kingdom and of the United States had, in 1945, suggested the advisability of Leopold's abdication. This, so far as the American Ambassador of that time was concerned, Mr. Charles SAWYER, was in complete contradiction of fact. Ambassador Sawyer throughout the tense days of 1945 had faithfully adhered to the Department's instructions which were expressed on March 30 of that year, and which have been consistently applied since. The essence of these instructions was that "the responsibility as to the future of the King should rest squarely on the shoulders of the Government of Belgium".50/ The American Embassy has consistently made clear to the Belgians that it has no part in the Royal Question other than reportorial one, and that this is one of the few important political questions of the present day in which the United States plays no role and exercises no influence.

In the last flurry of political fighting before the Popular Consultation was voted on February 8,51/ the Liberal Party [redacted] B-1 injected the question of the status of Leopold's second wife, the Princess de Rethy. The Liberal Deputies in the Chamber formally interpolated the Government on the question of whether or not the Princess was, or would be, Queen of the Belgians. The Constitution of this Kingdom makes no reference to the Queen. The Government, for its part, in a [redacted] report made by the Minister of Justice on February 2, revealed the text of the pre-nuptial declaration made by Leopold on the occasion of his civil marriage on December 6, 1941 and, for its own part, wound up [redacted] B-1 that the question of whether Leopold's wife would be Queen was a juridical one which could only be determined by courts, and that, in any case, it was not up to a government established by the Regent to seek a settlement of questions raised; that was "for the government which might be constituted by the King, in case the latter should eventually resume the exercise of his constitutional functions".52/ [redacted] B-1 opponents of the King claimed that if he returned, his commoner wife would become Queen while the proponents of Leopold III averred the contrary. [redacted] text of Leopold's B-1

statement of December 6, 1941, which makes it clear that he and his wife renounced any right by which she might assume the title of Queen, and furthermore, renounced any claim by issue of their marriage to the throne of Belgium.53/

VIII. CONCLUSION

The issues have thus been drawn at the cost of oceans of ink, volumes of oratory, and much expenditure of surface passion. It is to be doubted whether the mass of the Belgian people--workers, miners, peasants, and the middle class--have been stirred in their convictions one way or another by this immense ebullition. It seems probable that, as in the case of Napoleon's battalions, God will be on the side of the greatest numbers; and since, the Catholics and the Flemish population exceed in number their adversaries, the vote will at least reach the 55% which is the King's breaking point. It seems possible that should he poll 60%, Parliament, already heartily weary of the subject, would convene as one House to rescind the anchronistic and paradoxical law of July 19, 1945. Should, however, the vote be between 55% and 60%, there seems to be no escape from further temporizing and postponement of an issue which it is in the national interest to settle.

[redacted] B-1

In the Embassy's opinion, the chances of civil strife are not great. As indicated previously, the forces of Socialist labor are limited in their opportunity to foment trouble by political strikes because of the serious unemployment problem and the fact that the greatest part of organized labor is Catholic and, therefore, presumably pro-King. The Communists, of course, may be relied upon to make the most of this opportunity for trouble but their numbers are not large and their adherence to the anti-Leopold cause is, in fact, a source of embarrassment to the Socialists, and thus an element of weakness in the anti-Leopold ranks.

There is a growing conviction in the country that this vexing question must at last be settled. It is indeed a question now grown anchronistic with the passage of time.

[redacted] B-1

Belgium is the last of the countries to be fighting World War II while other countries are bending their energies in an attempt to prevent

World War III. However, as we have said in the beginning, the Belgian Royal Question is one of unremitting paradox.

[redacted]

B-1

Robert McClintock
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure: Citation to Footnotes

SECRET

Enclosure to Despatch 289
Brussels. March 4,. 1950

CITATIONS TO FOOTNOTES

1. Embassy despatch No. 266, February 24, 1950
2. Embassy telegram No. 199, February 8,
3. Department's Telegram to London 5934 July 28, 1944
4. Department's Telegram to London 6242 August 7, 1944
5. London's Telegram to Department 6596 August 16, 1944
6. Memorandum [redacted] January 12,1950 B-1
7. Embassy despatch No. 589, July 23, 1945, 601, August 2, 1945
8. Embassy telegram 1013, July 19, 1949
9. Embassy telegram 189, February 7, 1949
10. Embassy despatch 157, January 12, 1945
11. Embassy telegram (TS) 617 May 8, 1945; Paris telegram 2497, May 10,1945
12. Department's telegram (TS) 229 March 28, 1945
13. Embassy telegram 637, May 14, 1945
14. Embassy telegram 620, May 9, 1945
15. Embassy telegram 656, May 16, 1945
16. Embassy telegram 638, May 14, 1945
17. Embassy telegram 763, June 7; London telegram 5676, June 5, 1945
18. Embassy despatch 441, June 5, 1945
19. Embassy telegram 855, June 25, 1945
20. Embassy telegram 807, June 17, 1945
21. Embassy telegrams 821, June 19; 837, June 22,1945
22. Airgram 249 July 18, 1945
23. Embassy telegram, 952, July 17, 1945
24. Embassy telegram, 960, July 19, 1945
25. Embassy telegram, 956, July 26, 1946
26. Airgram 257, June 20, 1947
    Memorandum [redacted] June 24, 1947 B-1
    Embassy telegram 1026, June 27, 1947
27. Despatch 749 December 18, 1946
28. Embassy telegram 881 July 1, 1945; 888 July 2, 1945; 1299, October 18,1945
    Despatch 820, October 22, 1945; Embassy telegram 1362, November 5,1945;
    Despatch 883, November 8, 1945.
29. Eucom Intelligence Report APO 757, September 29, 1945
30. Despatch 430, July 2, 1948
31. Despatch 488, July 29, 1948; Despatch 495, July 30, 1948;
    Embassy telegram 1733, September 18, 1948

Footnote

32 Embassy Telegram 1931 of October 20, 1948
33 Airgram 285 of March 31, 1949
Embassy Telegram 1044 of July 28, 1949
34 Embassy Telegram 535 of April 11, 1949
35 Embassy Telegram 575 of April 18, 1949
Embassy Telegram 593 of April 22, 1949
Embassy Telegram 624 of April 28, 1949
Embassy Telegram 654 of May 4, 1949
36 Airgram-424 of May 20, 1949
37 Embassy Telegram 930 of June 30, 1949
Embassy Telegram 943 of July 2, 1949
Embassy Telegram 947 of July 4, 1949
38 Embassy Telegram 952 of July 8, 1949
39 Embassy Telegram 973 of July 8, 1949
Embassy Telegram 991 of July 14, 1949
40 Embassy Telegram 1035 of July 27, 1949
Embassy Telegram 1042 of July 28, 1949
Embassy Telegram 1055 of July 29, 1949
Embassy Telegram 1061 of July 30, 1949
41 Idem
Embassy Telegram 1070 of August 2, 1949
42 Embassy Telegram 1082 of August 4, 1949
43 Embassy Telegram 1087 of August 5, 1949
44 Embassy Telegram 1089 of August 6, 1949
45 Embassy Telegram 1371 of October 13, 1949
Airgram-895 of October 19, 1949
46 Embassy Telegram 1440 of October 27, 1949
Airgram-932 of October 28, 1949
47 Despatch 542 of November 2, 1949
48 Secret Letter, Ambassador Murphy to Secretary Acheson of December 17, 1949
49 Embassy Telegram 1692 of December 21, 1949
50 Top Secret Department's Telegram 239 of March 30, 1945
Department's Telegram 128 of February 1, 1950
51 Embassy Telegram 199 of February 8, 1950
52 Embassy Telegram 166 of February 2, 1950
53 Despatch 131 of February 2, 1950